Bomb in printer cartridges went undetected.

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Terrorists planted two bombs on separate cargo planes. Despite the bombs being x-ray'd twice in one case, and at least once in the other case, and despite other typical measures (bomb sniffing machines) being in use at the loading facilities, the bombs were undetected. They were hidden in the printer cartridges of printers being shipped across the Atlantic.

Wikipedia indicates that the 300g and 400g amounts of explosives used (under a pound each) were enough to level a house. Significantly less could have been used to blow a hole in the airplane.

On 29 October 2010, in the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 2010 cargo plane bomb plot, two PETN-filled printer cartridges were found at East Midlands Airport and in Dubai on flights bound for the United States. Both packages contained sophisticated, expertly constructed bombs concealed in computer printer cartridges filled with PETN.[40][41] The bomb found in England contained 400 grams (14 oz) of PETN (five times the amount needed to level a house), and the one found in Dubai contained 300 grams (11 oz) of PETN.[40] Hans Michels, professor of safety engineering at University College London, said that just 6 grams (0.2 oz) of PETN—around 50 times less than was used—would be enough to blow a hole in a metal plate twice the thickness of an aircraft's skin.[42] Intelligence agencies believed the packages were linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen. The two suspect packages—confirmed by Home Secretary Theresa May as "viable" and "could have exploded"—were addressed to synagogues in Chicago. U.S. and U.K. officials believe the planes, and not the addressees, were the targets.[43] The packages found on the planes triggered alerts in the U.S., the U.K., and the Middle East. Frank Cilluffo, the director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington University, said: "It is evident that had we not had the intelligence, our security countermeasures would not have identified these improvised explosive devices."[44] PETN is difficult to detect because it has a very low vapor pressure at room temperature, meaning very little of it gets into the air around the bomb, where it can be detected.[41] Qatar Airways said that "the explosives discovered [which it carried] were of a sophisticated nature whereby they could not be detected by X-ray screening or trained sniffer dogs", and were only discovered after an intelligence tip-off.[45][46][47][48] Both parcels were x-rayed in Sanaa, and the one in Dubai was x-rayed there, without the bombs being spotted.[49] The Bundeskriminalamt (BKA; the German Federal Criminal Police Office) received copies of the Dubai x-rays, and one BKA investigator said that German security staff would not have identified the bomb either.[49][50]
I wonder, though, if the security measures for cargo planes are more lax than passenger aircraft? I expect that if they could have, they would rather blow up people than pilots and cargo.

It was a toner cartridge for a laser printer - significantly larger than the inkjet cartridges you may be imagining.

Cargo plane bomb alert: explosive devices 'designed to harm US synagogues' - Telegraph

Turns out that in this case, human intelligence was required to detect the plot, and find and defuse the bombs (one only minutes prior to its intended detonation).
 
I've always said that there are exactly 2 facts protecting us from terrorism.

1. The terrorists are just as stupid as the people who are supposed to be defending us

2. The terrorists are just as lazy as the people who are supposed to be defending us.

I mean this plan would have gone off without a hitch if it weren't for somebody in the plot flapping their mouth. But like the underwear bomber and other plots it failed because of human error.
 
I've always said that there are exactly 2 facts protecting us from terrorism.

1. The terrorists are just as stupid as the people who are supposed to be defending us

2. The terrorists are just as lazy as the people who are supposed to be defending us.

I mean this plan would have gone off without a hitch if it weren't for somebody in the plot flapping their mouth. But like the underwear bomber and other plots it failed because of human error.
We'd be a lot safer, and there'd be a lot less hassle at the airports, if the TSA would get rid of all their mall cop wannabes and start hiring people who actually care about the mission and the people they're supposed to be protecting: it's the PASSENGERS, stupid!

The majority of those screeners I wouldn't hire to clean the airport toilets.
 
I've always said that there are exactly 2 facts protecting us from terrorism.

1. The terrorists are just as stupid as the people who are supposed to be defending us

2. The terrorists are just as lazy as the people who are supposed to be defending us.

I mean this plan would have gone off without a hitch if it weren't for somebody in the plot flapping their mouth. But like the underwear bomber and other plots it failed because of human error.
We'd be a lot safer, and there'd be a lot less hassle at the airports, if the TSA would get rid of all their mall cop wannabes and start hiring people who actually care about the mission and the people they're supposed to be protecting: it's the PASSENGERS, stupid!

The majority of those screeners I wouldn't hire to clean the airport toilets.[/QUOTE]

As long as you're willing to double or triple your flight costs. The reality is that you'd be hiring thousands of people with twice the salary of the current yokels, and they would each have a one in a thousand chance of finding something interesting once a year.

Even if you could do that, they would become complacent and bored since they'd be scanning thousands of passengers and luggage each day with no real finds.

The problem is that it happens so infrequently. It is the proverbial needle in the haystack.

So the cost equation is:

Status quo: 95% detection capability with a cost of X
Your suggestion: 97% detection capability with a cost of 2 * X

Is that extra 3% worth the additional cost? Yes, the numbers are invented, but there is a point of diminishing returns.
 
C

Chibibar

a lot of HP cartridge for big printers are big enough. I guess with all the "sniffers" out there, the bad guys are being more careful and seal the container from being detected (or lazy inspectors). The article states that the only way the authorities found out because someone squealed.
 
I've always said that there are exactly 2 facts protecting us from terrorism.

1. The terrorists are just as stupid as the people who are supposed to be defending us

2. The terrorists are just as lazy as the people who are supposed to be defending us.

I mean this plan would have gone off without a hitch if it weren't for somebody in the plot flapping their mouth. But like the underwear bomber and other plots it failed because of human error.
I disagree pretty strongly with this. Yeah, of course there are stupid people in authority, yeah we have assholes in our military, police, etc. But for the most part we're defended because of the intelligence, work and bravery of people protecting us, for whom I have nothing but the utmost respect.

I do, however, agree that terrorists seem pretty stupid.
 
I've always said that there are exactly 2 facts protecting us from terrorism.

1. The terrorists are just as stupid as the people who are supposed to be defending us

2. The terrorists are just as lazy as the people who are supposed to be defending us.

I mean this plan would have gone off without a hitch if it weren't for somebody in the plot flapping their mouth. But like the underwear bomber and other plots it failed because of human error.
We'd be a lot safer, and there'd be a lot less hassle at the airports, if the TSA would get rid of all their mall cop wannabes and start hiring people who actually care about the mission and the people they're supposed to be protecting: it's the PASSENGERS, stupid!

The majority of those screeners I wouldn't hire to clean the airport toilets.[/QUOTE]

As long as you're willing to double or triple your flight costs. The reality is that you'd be hiring thousands of people with twice the salary of the current yokels, and they would each have a one in a thousand chance of finding something interesting once a year.

Even if you could do that, they would become complacent and bored since they'd be scanning thousands of passengers and luggage each day with no real finds.

The problem is that it happens so infrequently. It is the proverbial needle in the haystack.

So the cost equation is:

Status quo: 95% detection capability with a cost of X
Your suggestion: 97% detection capability with a cost of 2 * X

Is that extra 3% worth the additional cost? Yes, the numbers are invented, but there is a point of diminishing returns.[/QUOTE]

It does not matter if they find anything, ever. What matters is that the people doing the job are the least bit competent. Anecdotal data suggests that the current lot are anything but.

Rotate people to other duties if you worry about complacency. Costs be damned if it means getting rid of that junior high dropout with five kids by five fathers who is only there to bully passengers.
 
I've always said that there are exactly 2 facts protecting us from terrorism.

1. The terrorists are just as stupid as the people who are supposed to be defending us

2. The terrorists are just as lazy as the people who are supposed to be defending us.

I mean this plan would have gone off without a hitch if it weren't for somebody in the plot flapping their mouth. But like the underwear bomber and other plots it failed because of human error.
We'd be a lot safer, and there'd be a lot less hassle at the airports, if the TSA would get rid of all their mall cop wannabes and start hiring people who actually care about the mission and the people they're supposed to be protecting: it's the PASSENGERS, stupid!

The majority of those screeners I wouldn't hire to clean the airport toilets.[/QUOTE]

As long as you're willing to double or triple your flight costs. The reality is that you'd be hiring thousands of people with twice the salary of the current yokels, and they would each have a one in a thousand chance of finding something interesting once a year.

Even if you could do that, they would become complacent and bored since they'd be scanning thousands of passengers and luggage each day with no real finds.

The problem is that it happens so infrequently. It is the proverbial needle in the haystack.

So the cost equation is:

Status quo: 95% detection capability with a cost of X
Your suggestion: 97% detection capability with a cost of 2 * X

Is that extra 3% worth the additional cost? Yes, the numbers are invented, but there is a point of diminishing returns.[/QUOTE]

It does not matter if they find anything, ever. What matters is that the people doing the job are the least bit competent. Anecdotal data suggests that the current lot are anything but.

Rotate people to other duties if you worry about complacency. Costs be damned if it means getting rid of that junior high dropout with five kids by five fathers who is only there to bully passengers.[/QUOTE]

I'm pretty sure the people who do this work are reasonably competent within their little niche. The system, as designed, is very interesting - apparently the machines insert random bombs, knives, etc into the images of the luggage. When a person sees something interesting, they push a button, and the machine removes the 'fake' items (if any). In a sense it's an ongoing test for the alertness of the person doing the scans. If they let something go by then their supervisor deals with them.

Quite frankly, if we knew robots could do the work well, we wouldn't have a problem automating everything, so why not cheap humans that are trained better than robots? We don't need security experts in every single position...

---------- Post added at 01:30 AM ---------- Previous post was at 01:28 AM ----------

In other words, they are playing a video game all day long.
 
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